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The Corn Belt Meat Producers'
Association of Iowa: Origins of
a Progressive Pressure Group
Keach Johnson
THE ROOTS OF AGRICULTURAL PROGRESSIVISM in
Iowa are to be found in the changes which science and technology
produced in the nature of farming following the Civil War: in the
emergence of the "new agriculture" which was well under way in
Iowa by the turn of the century. As the farmers of the state devel-
oped a stable and diversified system of production based on corn,
beef, pork, and milk, their interests became increasingly special-
ized, and they began to form commodity organizations to protect
and promote the interests of particular groups of producers. The
programs of these associations were varied. They often included
educational campaigns to promote more efficient production;
cooperatives designed to free farmers from the exactions of mid-
dlemen; and lobbies and pressure tactics seeking state and
federal laws that would meet the needs and remedy the grievances
of the farmers. Iowa farmers generally agreed, however, that one
of their greatest needs was more effective state and federal regula-
tion of the "combinations," notably the railroads and the trusts.
Consequently, Iowa farm organizations became increasingly in-
volved in the politics of protest and reform that was so character-
istic of the progressive upheaval in Iowa and other midwestern
states. Agricultural progressivism, then, is used here to refer to the
collective efforts of Iowa farmers in dealing with the problems of
the emerging industrial order by invoking the powers of the state
and federal governments to protect and promote their economic
interests. '
'Earle D. Ross, Iowa Agriculture: An Historical Survey (Iowa City: State
Historical Society of Iowa. 1951). chs. 6-8.
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Illustrative of this process was the emergence in 1904 of the
Corn Belt Meat Producers' Association of Iowa in response to the
rapid and far-reaching changes that were transforming the pro-
duction, transportation, and marketing of livestock at the turn of
the century. "That we are entering upon a period of transition,
which can almost be called a quiet revolution, many believe and
few deny," A. L. Ames, the president of the meat producers'
association, commented in 1905. A major element in the transi-
tion was a sharp rise in production costs resulting from the in-
creasing value of land and corn. Reflecting the passing of the
frontier, the prices paid for Iowa land rose from an average of $14
an acre in 1871 to $16 in 1881 and then jumped to $27 in 1891
and $44 in 1901. The price of corn, which continued to be the
principal livestock food but was also used increasingly for other
purposes, fluctuated from year to year but the overall trend was
upward, the average price in Iowa rising from 14 cents a bushel in
1896 to 51 cents in 1908. Iowa stockmen were forced to recognize,
therefore, that they had entered an era of rising costs which could
only be cut through improved methods of production.^
The need to produce meat more economically and efficiently
stimulated the interest of Iowa farmers in the scientific breeding
and feeding of livestock which began in the state during the late
nineteenth century and grew rapidly between 1900 and World
War I. Iowa cattlemen turned increasingly to purebred Short-
horns, Herefords, and Polled Angus which matured more quickly
and produced better beef more economically than the nondescript
scrubs brought in by the settlers. Improvements in feeding neces-
sarily accompanied improvements in breeding. Where Iowa farm-
ers had formerly raised their cattle on grass—grazing herds of
cattle on the open prairie continued in northwestern Iowa as late
as 1890—and fattened them for market by stuffing them with as
much corn as possible for a few months, they now began to utilize
timothy, clover, alfalfa, and corn silage plus nitrogeneous supple-
ments, such as gluten, oil, and cottonseed meals. The new feed-
ing methods provided a more efficient and better balanced ration
than the old. By 1910, Iowa cattle were as well finished and as
'Wallaces' Farmer. June 17, 1904, Feb. 17, 1905, 808, 220; State Auditor,
Biennial Report. 1901. Iowa Documents (Des Moines, 1902), 1:229-234; "Statisti-
cal Tables of Iowa's Principal Farm Crops," Iowa Year Book of Agriculture (cited
hereafter as la. YBA). 1908, Part II, 58.
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heavy at two years of age as they had been at three or four years in
the mid-nineties.'
Pressure to cut costs was by no means the only factor impel-
ling Iowa cattlemen to improve their methods of production. Of
equal and more immediate force were the changing tastes of the
American consumer. Not only were the American people eating
more beef—per capita consumption rose from 72.3 pounds in
1900 to 77.9 pounds in 1905—but they were also demanding
better beef. Public insistence on better quality began to influence
cattle markets in the 1890s when demand shifted from heavy
steers, three to four years old, to younger and lighter steers with
as good or better finish. Particularly important was the rapid
growth of public enthusiasm for "baby beef: young cattle ready
for market at twelve to twenty-two months, weighing 800 to 1200
pounds. The popularity of baby beef coincided with the cattle in-
dustry's need for more efficient production, since young cattle
gained weight more rapidly and economically in proportion to the
amount of feed used and could be marketed sooner than older
stock. Feeders turned increasingly, therefore, to the production
of baby beef. "In the feedlots of the Corn-belt this winter there
are many calves whose owners never fed a calf or beef before," the
Breeders Gazette reported in 1904. The production of baby beef,
however, was an exacting occupation, requiring well-bred cattle,
scientific feeding, and intensive care. The production of beef, in
short, had become a highly specialized business, demanding capi-
tal, equipment, and skillful management.*
Another major factor in the transformation of the livestock in-
dustry, according to Iowa farmers, was the rise in shipping costs.
They complained that their shipping costs had risen, not because
the railroads were charging higher freight rates but because they
were giving poorer service. * Cattle shippers complained particu-
'John A. Hopkins, "Economic History of the Production of Beef Cattle in
Iowa," Iowa Journal of History and Politics. 26 (January 1928), 136-139; (April
1928), 208-210, 222, 229-232, 234-235, 237-240, 256-262.
'John T. Schiebecker, Cattle Raising on the Plains. 1900-1961 (Lincoln: Uni-
versity of Nebraska Press, 1963), 17-18, et passim; Hopkins. (April 1928),
208-209. 263-265, et passim; Wallaces Farmer. Jan. 13, 1905, Feb. 23, 1906, 34,
278; la. YBA. 1904, 341, 363.
' A. L. Ames said that the farmers would not complain about rates if the rail-
roads gave good service. "What we do object to is their charging the same rates for
the inferior service, and what we ask is that the rates and service should be com-
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larly of the greater delays and the slower speeds of livestock trains
which caused cattle to lose weight and bring lower prices, thereby
imposing losses on the shipper that were equivalent to an increase
in real or actual rates. They attributed the deterioration of service
to the railroads' adoption of the tonnage system which was de-
signed to haul a maximum amount of freight at a minimum cost
per ton-mile: to haul as many cars as possible per locomotive in
order to economize on fuel and labor. To this end, the railroads
improved their roadbeds, straightened their tracks, laid heavier
rails, used bigger cars, and introduced "mogul" locomotives
which operated most efficiently at speeds often to twelve miles an
hour and were capable of carrying sixty to eighty cars of live-
stock.'
Iowa farmers did not object to the application of the tonnage
system to dead freight, recognizing that it was in the public inter-
est for the railroads to haul coal, wheat, and the like as cheaply as
possible. They objected strenuously, however, to the use of heavy,
slow-moving trains to haul livestock. Cattle shipped from central
and western Iowa had formerly reached Chicago in twenty hours
or so but under the tonnage system, they sometimes spent as
many as forty hours in transit. Even with the best management,
stockmen pointed out, cattle shrank continuously in actual food
value as well as weight from the time they left the feedlot until
they reached the packinghouse. The increase of shrink, more-
over, was greater proportionately than the increased time of the
haul. Shrinkage during the first twelve to twenty-four hours of
shipment consisted largely of filling which could be at least par-
tially replaced when the hungry cattle were fed upon arriving at
the Chicago stockyards. When cattle spent twenty-eight, thirty-
six or forty hours en route, however, they were too tired to fill
properly, resulting in additional shrinkage of twenty-five to fifty
pounds per steer and an estimated average loss of $20 to $25 per
mensúrate with each other, and that for the present substantial rates we should re-
ceive a quality of service that such rates demand." A. L. Ames to Senator Jona-
than P. Dolliver. Jan. 19, 1905, Jonathan Prentiss Dolliver Papers (State Histori-
cal Society of Iowa, Iowa City).
"Wallaces^Farmer. March 11, 18, 25, April 29, May 13, 1904, 366, 403, 439,
603, 667, 669.
'Ibid.. March 25, April 22, 29, 1904, 439, 573, 603-605. Wallace based his
calculation of the additional hours and shrinkage resulting from slower hauls on
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Slower hauls also resulted in lower prices. Livestock trains
sometimes arrived in Chicago too late for the day's market, forc-
ing the shipper either to sell his cattle to speculators for less than
the market price or to hold them over to the next day's market at
additional expense. Cattle that were jaded by a long haul, more-
over, sold for less than those that were fresh. Choice steers, quali-
fied for sale in eastern or European markets, fell into the packing
class because of over-fatigue and inadequate filling and had to be
sold for dressed beef, entailing an estimated average loss of
twenty-five cents per hundredweight. Wallaces' Farmer estimated
that losses resulting from excessive shrinkage and depreciation
"frequently" ran as high as $75 to $100 per car. Such losses had
created a crisis for the entire cattle industry, the journal con-
tinued, for the railroads had extended the tonnage system
throughout the western cattle country, from Chicago to the
Pacific coast.'
Closely related to the complaints of Iowa stockmen against the
railroads were their complaints against the meatpackers. It was
an article of faith among Iowa farmers that the "Beef and Pork
Combine of Chicago," described by H. C. Wallace as "absolutely
the most dangerous trust in the United States," fixed the prices of
livestock and meat, exploiting producers and consumers alike. A.
L. Ames admitted that it was difficult to prove that the packers
controlled the market, but he told the Iowa Farmers' Institute in
1904 that there was ample circumstantial evidence to warrant
such belief. As a case in point, Ames stated that the Big Four
paid good prices for cattle during the spring and summer of 1902
in order to force the independent packers into line. This was ac-
complished at the end of October when the packers reached an
agreement to fix prices. Thereafter, the price of cattle fell
sharply, sacrificing the welfare of farmers to "the greed of a
monopoly that expects to filch increasingly from the larder of the
producer," declared Ames.'
figures supplied by shippers. See summary of shippers' reports, April 29, 605.
'Ibid., March 11, 15, April 8, 22, 29, May 13, 1904, 366, 439, 509, 573, 603,
618, 667. Wallace declared that cattlemen could not endure such "tremendous"
shrinkage. If it continued, "the whole system of handling cattle must be adjusted.
The man who grows stock cattle must in the future sell them at lower prices to the
feeder or the feeder must quit the business."
'A. L. Ames, "SomeThoughtsfor the Cattle Feeder"; F. A. Delano, "Trans-
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Iowa farmers charged that the packers, like the Standard Oil
Company, had achieved a monopoly through their private car
lines: that their ownership of refrigerator cars had enabled the
packers to obtain rebates and favorable freight rates by compel-
ling the railroads to bid against one another for the privilege of
hauling their cars. The classic example of such discrimination
was between Chicago and Missouri river points, notably Kansas
City and Omaha, where the railroads not only carried dressed
meat cheaper than livestock but also paid the packers one cent a
mile for the use of their refrigerator cars. During the 1890s, fol-
lowing an order by the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1890,
the published rates on cattle, hogs, dressed beef, and packing
house products hauled from Missouri river points to Chicago had
been the same—23.5 cents per hundredweight. Around 1900,
however. President Stickney of the Chicago Great Western en-
tered into an agreement with the packers to carry dressed beef
and packing house products from Kansas City to eastern markets
at 18.5 cents per hundredweight. After a brief rate war, the other
railroads adopted the Stickney rate which then became the pre-
vailing rate on the shipment of meat from the Missouri river east-
ward. Livestock rates remained the same, however; farmers in
western Iowa, from Des Moines to the Missouri River, continued
to pay 23.5 cents to ship their livestock to Chicago.'"
Iowa stockmen argued further that an analysis of the com-
parative cost of hauling meat and livestock showed clearly that
the railroads carried meat at bare cost or less and made up their
losses at the expense of the farmers. A refrigerator car was not
only heavier and more expensive to haul than a cattle car, since it
included 6,000 pounds of ice and salt and 3,000 pounds of equip-
ment for hanging beef, but it also carried a somewhat smaller
average payload than the cattle car: 22,000 pounds of beef as
against 23,000 pounds of cattle. At 18.5 cents per 100 pounds,
the packer paid the railroad $40.70 to haul dressed beef from the
Missouri River to Chicago, of which $10 was a rebate for the use
of the refrigerator car—one cent a mile for the 1,000 mile round
portation—Its Relation to the Farm"; Annual Proceedings, State Farmers'
Institute, Dec. 13, 1904, la. YBA. 1904, 10-16, 34-42.
'°F. A. Delano, "Transportation—Its Relation to the Iowa Farm," 34-42;
Wallaces' Farmer. Sept. 30, Oct. 28, Nov. 25, 1904, 1182, 1328, 1460; W. E.
Keepers to T. J. Hudson, Dec. 30, 1904, enclosure, Stuyvesant Fish to Dolliver,
Jan. 4, 1905, Dolliver Papers.
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trip—leaving the railroad a return of $30.70. At 23.5 cents per
100 pounds, the farmer paid $54.05 for the comparable haul to
which the railroad added a $2 terminal charge for delivering the
cattle to the Union Stockyards. After the railroad deducted $6 for
the rental of the cattle car, the farmer's shipment jdelded $50.05,
two-fifths more than the packer's shipment. It seemed clear to
Iowa farmers, therefore, that if the 18.5 cent rate on beef was rea-
sonable, they were paying some $20 more on every carload of
cattle than they ought to pay. Wallaces ' Farmer calculated that
the "tribute" levied by the railroads and packers on Iowa fanners
totaled more than $1,000,000 annually. "Is it any wonder that the
beef trust prospers?" asked Wallace."
Convinced that the railroads were subsidizing the beef trust at
the expense of the farmers, Iowa stockmen were in a rebellious
mood by 1904. "There is a deep and widespread disaffection of
the farmers and shippers of Iowa and other states as well, against
the railroads," reported Wallaces' Farmer. The smoldering re-
sentment of Iowa farmers burst into flame when the railroads de-
cided, effective January 1, 1904, to stop giving return passes to
fanners who accompanied their cattle to market. The railroads
justified their decision on the ground that there was no longer any
need for farmers to accompany their livestock and that stockmen
had abused the privilege of free transportation by allowing others
to use their passes. The railroads pointed out further that numer-
ous accidents occurred on livestock trains for which they were
liable, forcing them to pay thousands of dollars in damages to
those traveling on stock passes, many of whom were not bona fide
shippers.'^
"Wallaces'Farmer, Sept. 30, Nov. 25, 1904, March 10, 17, May 12, 1905,
1182, 1460, 335, 366, 654. Iowa farmers found further justification for their com-
plaints of discrimination when the Interstate Commerce Commission ruled on
January 7, 1905, in reference to a complaint filed by the Chicago Stockyards Com-
pany on April 3, 1904, that the discrepancy in meat and livestock rates between
the Missouri River and Chicago was discriminatory and ordered the railroads to
equalize the two sets of rates. However, the railroads refused to obey the order,
forcing the Commission to appeal to the federal courts to enforce its decision.
Noting that the case might very well be tied up in the courts for several years and
that Iowa farmers must continue meanwhile to pay existing rates, Wallaces'
Farmer declared that the only remedy for such discrimination was to give the In-
terstate Commerce Commission power to fix and promptly enforce just rates.
Ibid.. Oct. 28, 1904, March 10, May 12, Sept. 29, Oct. 20, 1905, 1328, 335, 654,
1130, 1228.
"The pass question is discussed in almost every issue of Wallaces' Farmer
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Iowa stockmen promptly protested that the cancellation of
return passes violated an understanding going back to the early
days of railroading in Iowa. They argued that the practice of giv-
ing return passes had originated in the insistence of the railroads
that fanners accompany their cattle to see that they were not
knocked down and trampled or otherwise injured during ship-
ment. Improvements in roadbeds and rolling stock had lessened
but not eliminated the need for supervision; it was still necessary
for the farmer to accompany his stock, not only to see that it was
properly handled and sold but also to gain a better understanding
of the market as a basis for future feeding. The farmer who
accompanied his stock to market was, in effect, a temporary
employee of the railroad and, therefore, entitled to free transpor-
tation. Iowa stockmen admitted that some farmers had abused
the pass system but held that the real culprits were the station
agents and conductors who had long conducted a traffic in return
passes, giving or selling them to merchants and other infiuential
persons in their communities.'^
Wallaces' Farmer sdiVi the cancellation of return passes as an-
other maneuver by the railroads to increase their earnings at the
farmers' expense. The journal estimated that the actual shipping
costs of farmers in central and western Iowa had risen $25 to $30
per car: $5 as a result of the cancellation of the return pass and
$20 to $25 because of the increased shrinkage resulting from
slower hauls. Adding a "possible loss" of 25 cents per lCX) pounds
for choice cattle which had to be sold for dressed beef instead of
eastern shipment, Wallaces' Farmer declared that the evidence
was "absolutely overwhelming" that the feeders of Kansas,
Missouri, Nebraska, and South Dakota, as well as those in cen-
tral and western Iowa, were "being bled systematically" by the
railroads. The western Corn Belt had become "a sort of second
Ireland" which the railroads were exploiting through their rate
system in much the same way that non-resident landlords had ex-
ploited Ireland for hundreds of years through their rent system.
"This condition of things is intolerable and we have lost the spirit
of'76 if we endure it patiently any longer," continued Wallaces'
during the winter and spring of 1904; see particularly the issues of Jan. 1, March
18, April 22, May 13, 6, 403, 573, 666.
"Ibid.. Jan. 1, May 13, Aug. 19, 1904, 6, 666, 1020.
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Farmer. "The tea tax and the stamp tax were mere peccadilos
[sic] as compared with this present system of blood sucking per-
petrated on the feeders of the cattle growing states.""*
The Sam Adams of Iowa feeders was James J. Ryan of Fort
Dodge, one of the state's largest livestock shippers. Convinced
that stockmen must organize to protect their interests, Ryan ob-
tained a list of the leading cattle feeders of the state from the
county auditors. He then sent a circular letter to two or three
feeders in each county, asking their views on the advisability of
calling a meeting of the state's meat producers. Receiving favor-
able responses from all but one of his correspondents, Ryan
thereupon invited the men on his list, some 1,000 in all, to attend
a meeting in Des Moines.'^
On January 21, 1904, 250 farmers, representing every county in
Iowa and controlling more than sixty percent of the livestock
shipped out of the state, assembled in Des Moines in response to
Ryan's invitation. Ryan opened the meeting by declaring that the
presence of men from every corner of the state showed that the
cattle feeders and shippers of Iowa had finally awakened to the
need to protect their interests. There was no need to waste time
discussing grievances; everyone present knew what was wrong
with the cattle industry. The thing to do was to organize. Noting
that the Corn Belt produced the bulk of the world's supply of corn
fed beef, Ryan called for the organization of a regional associa-
tion of meat producers to include every state and county in the
Corn Belt. The association's goal would be to free farmers from
the clutches of the railroads and packers. "The railroads who are
now handling every feeder's steers as dead freight, and every
feeder as a deadbeat are in need of prompt attention," affirmed
Ryan. The association should also investigate the cost of setting
up an independent packing plant and consider the possibility of
cooperating with the National Livestock Association in its recent
endorsement of a proposal to build packing houses in the princi-
pal livestock markets to compete with the packers' combine and
raise livestock prices."
''Ibid.. Jan. 1, March 11, 25, April 29, 1904, 6, 366, 439, 603.
"Fort Dodge Messenger, Jan. 8, 26, 1904.
"Ibid.. Jan. 26, \')0^; Des Moines Register and Leader. Jan. 22, 1904; Wal-
laces' Farmer. Feb. 5. 1904, 175. In discussing the advantages of organization.
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Ryan's timing proved to be excellent, for the assemblage en-
dorsed the substance of his proposals. Denouncing the poor ser-
vice, extortionate charges, and discriminatory practices of the
railroads and packers, the cattlemen voted to organize the live-
stock feeders, shippers, and farmers of the state into the Corn
Belt Meat Producers' Association of Iowa and to help organize
similar state associations throughout the Corn Belt; elected offi-
cers headed by President Ames, Secretary Ryan, and a Board of
Directors, one from each of the state's eleven Congressional dis-
tricts; directed their officers to investigate the cost of establishing
an independent packing plant; demanded state and federal legis-
lation to remedy their grievances; and selected five of their mem-
bers to act as lobbyists, including Ames, Ryan, and Frederick C.
Larrabee of Fort Dodge, son of ex-Governor William Larrabee."
Moving immediately to obtain state legislation requiring rail-
roads to give better service, the meat producers urged the General
Assembly to pass a bill introduced on January 27 by Representa-
tive L. L. DeLano of Cass County, an attorney of Atlantic, the
county seat and one of the leading livestock shipping centers of
southwestern Iowa. Entitled "a bill for an act to define the duties
of railroad companies in the shipment of livestock," the DeLano
bill was a comprehensive measure which required railroads in
Iowa to receive, transport, and deliver stock "without any un-
necessary delay." The key provisions of the bill were those dealing
with the transportation of livestock shippers and the speed of live-
stock trains. The railroads must furnish free transportation both
ways to all shippers of one or more carloads of livestock. The roads
must give livestock precedence over dead freight; if shipment of
the two confiicted, dead freight was to be side-tracked and live-
stock trains given the right-of-way. Finally, railroads must haul
livestock, whether inside or outside of the state, at not less than
twenty miles an hour; failure to do so would make the roads liable
for all losses suffered by shippers, including shrinkage and depre-
ciation of the stock, lower prices, and extra expense."
Ryan noted the trend among businessmen to organize trade associations to control
markets and stabilize prices. "We can at least so regulate the prices of livestock
that we will be able to know where we are at," Ryan stated.
''Register and Leader. Jan. 22, Feb. 18, March 1, 2, 3, 1904; Wallaces'
Farmer. Feb. 5, 26, March 11, 18, 1904, 175, 286, 367, 421.
"Register and Leader. Jan. 28, Feb. 18, March 2, 3, 1904; Wallaces'
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"How did you happen to draft the bill?" a reporter asked De-
Lano. "Simply because it was the principal thing I heard while
making my campaign last fall," the latter replied. "Every farmer
and stockman was talking about the way they were being treated
by the railroads." It had been reported that DeLano had intro-
duced the bill at the instigation of livestock shippers, but he in-
sisted that he had made no commitment during the campaign
and that only one person knew beforehand that he was going to
introduce the bill. He added that he had received petitions signed
by more than 5,000 stockmen, demanding passage of the bill. "If
the railroads are not careful and do not make some concessions to
the farmers, they will have another grange movement to fight,"
warned DeLano. "The people of Iowa want relief from the restric-
tions the railroads are trying to place on them, and they will have
it.""
Whether DeLano was acting independently or as the legisla-
tive agent of the meat producers is immaterial. His bill included
their key demands, and they gave it their full support. On Febru-
ary 17-18, some thirty or forty of the meat producers, organized
and led by Ryan, attended the hearings of the House Committee
on Railroads and Commerce to urge approval of the DeLano bill.
Ryan made an opening statement and then assisted DeLano in
examining the stockmen. They testified that shippers must
accompany their stock because cattle were injured and sometimes
killed during shipment, or shipments were mixed and had to be
separated by their owners upon arrival in Chicago; that livestock
trains were side-tracked to permit the passage of the dressed meat
trains of Armour and Swift; that cattle sometimes arrived in
Chicago too late for the day's market; and that losses caused by
delays in shipment ran as high as $50 a car. "
Farmer, March 11, 1904, 367; House File No. 7, Legislative Papers, 1904, Thirti-
eth General Assembly, Box 391 (Iowa State Department of History and Archives).
"Register and Leader. Feb. 10. 16, 1904. "In Cass County no more popular
measure in the way of legislation could hardly have been conceived," observed the
Atlantic Messenger on March 4, 1904. "Cass County is a stock shipping locality
and many of the farmers ship their stock to market themselves. There are enough
of them to create a very general popular sentiment in its [DeLano bill's] favor."
'"Register and Leader. Feb. 18, 19, March 2, 1904. A northwestern Iowa
stockman said that the "discriminations" of the railroads cost him $10,000 in
1903 and that he would have to quit the livestock business if the legislature failed
to remedy the grievances of shippers.
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The meat producers were given a sympathetic hearing by the
legislators, many of whom were themselves farmers and stock-
men. '^ The Atlantic Telegraph reported that most legislators
recognized the needs of livestock shippers and that many were
determined to enact remedial legislation. Even the railroad
lobbyists admitted that the roads must improve their service. The
Telegraph doubted that the DeLano bill would pass, reporting
that it was "the prevalent opinion in Des Moines" that the bill
would be killed in committee and a more practicable measure
substituted for it. The DeLano bill was "too heavy" and
cumbersome, containing provisions that imposed needless
burdens on the railroads without benefiting the farmers. The
Telegraph was confident, however, that the legislature would
enact some form of railway legislation for the relief of the live-
stock shippers."
Observers agreed that the DeLano bill was of major impor-
tance. The struggle over the bill "promises to be one of the warm-
est fights that the Iowa legislature has witnessed in years," ob-
served the Des Moines Register and Leader. The railroad lobby
was "badly frightened." Convinced that the DeLano bill would
pass both houses in whatever form it was submitted to them, the
lobby was "pulUng every wire at its command" to defeat or
modify the bill in committee. Noting that railroad officials were
urging farmers in the principal livestock districts to write their
senators and representatives in opposition to the bill and were
paying all of the expenses of those who were willing to testify
against it, the Register and Leader estimated that the railroads
had brought at least fifty livestock shippers from various parts of
the state to Des Moines to speak against the DeLano bill."
"Of the 150 members of the General Assembly—100 Representatives and 50
Senators—37 were farmers or farmers and stockmen, 7 combined farming with
other occupations, such as banking, manufacturing and preaching, and 3 were
grain and livestock dealers. The House included 28 farmers or farmer-stockmen,
6 in combined occupations, and the 3 grain and livestock dealers. There were 9
farmers or farmer-stock breeders in the Senate and 1 farmer-banker. Thirtieth
General Assembly,/ouma/o/iAei/ou.se (Des Moines, 1904), iv-\i, Journal of the
Senate (Des Moines, 1904), iv-v. DeLano estimated that some 35 members of the
legislature were "directly interested" in the "livestock business." Register and
Leader. Feb. 16, 1904.
"Atlantic Telegraph. Feb. 19, 23, 1904.
"Register and Leader. Feb. 16, March 2, 1904. The DeLano bill posed a
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That the DeLano bill alarmed the railroads was attested by
the impressive array of railroad officials who appeared before the
House Committee on Railroads and Commerce to oppose it. In
addition to their attorneys, the Burlington, Milwaukee, and
Northwestern sent their general managers: F. A. Delano, H. R.
Williams, and W. A. Gardner, respectively. J. M. Daly, Superin-
tendent of Transportation, spoke for the Illinois Central, and H.
J. Slifer, General Superintendent, represented the Rock Island.
Attacking the DeLano bill section by section, the officials de-
clared that its provisions were either useless or harmful. Object-
ing to the free transportation of shippers, the general managers
reiterated that stockmen had abused the pass system, Gardner
citing, as an example, a recent month in which the Northwestern
had carried 1.300 men to Chicago on shippers' passes only to find
that 300 of them were not shippers. The officials acknowledged
that the roads sometimes gave priority to the packers but denied
that they made a practice of sidetracking livestock trains to per-
mit the passage of dressed beef trains.^*
The general managers conceded that livestock shipments were
slower than formerly but attributed this to the increasing number
of stock trains and the delays encountered in transferring and un-
loading the stock in Chicago. They pointed out that the Union
Stockyards in Chicago received 203,000 carloads of stock in 1903,
an increase of 30,000 over 1902. They noted further that most
farmers continued to adhere to the traditional two-day marketing
pattern: to believe that Monday and Wednesday were the best
market days and to ship their stock accordingly. The resulting
glut overtaxed the facilities of the Union Stockyards and Ter-
minal company which transferred the animals into the stock-
yards, causing congestion and delay. Moving livestock into the
stockyards frequently required two to five hours; livestock trains
arriving in Chicago at seven o'clock in the morning sometimes
were not unloaded until noon. Declaring that the railroads were
serious threat to the railroads, for the hauling of Iowa livestock constituted an im-
portant part of their business. In 1903, for example, Iowa farmers marketed
72,975 carloads of cattle and 62,388 carloads of hogs, shipping 90 percent of the
cattle and 67 percent of the hogs to Chicago where Iowa shipments accounted for
40 percent of all cattle and 50 percent of all hogs received in 1903. "Cattle and
Hogs Sold for Slaughter from Iowa in 1903," la. YBA. 1904, 352.
"Register and Leader. Feb. 10, March 2, 3, 1904.
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doing everything possible to speed up shipments, the managers
stated that the number of livestock trains arriving late in Chicago
had been reduced from twenty percent in 1902 to seven percent in
1903. They insisted that the roads compensated shippers fully for
delays, W. A. Gardner testifying, for example, that in 1903 the
Northwestern, the largest livestock carrier in Iowa, had paid
shippers $50,000 for losses resulting from delays."
The general managers focused much of their attack on the
clause in the DeLano bill that required the roads to haul livestock
at an average minimum speed of twenty miles an hour. They said
that the most economical speed for freight trains was ten to twelve
miles an hour: to run them faster would be costly and dangerous
if not physically impossible. Allowing for the delays which
occurred in switching cars in yards and terminals, the average
speed of a freight train on a 200 mile haul did not exceed five
miles an hour. "We get only twenty-two miles per day out of our
stock cars, on the average," testified J. M. Daly of the Illinois
Central. "How could we then make a minimum of twenty miles
per hour, as this bill contemplates?" Greater speed would invite
accidents and endanger the safety of crews, shippers, and stock.
"Safety demands that ten or fifteen minutes shall elapse between
trains," declared W. A. Gardner. "Running twenty-five trains in
a day, we [the Northwestern] can't get them all into Chicago in
less than 250 minutes, from the arrival of the first to the arrival of
the last."'»
Railroad attorneys rounded out the testimony of the general
managers by challenging the constitutionality of the DeLano bill.
Noting that the bill made no distinction between livestock ship-
ments inside and outside the state and that most such shipments
originating in Iowa were to points outside the state, the attorneys
argued that Iowa had no constitutional authority to regulate the
speed of interstate livestock trains or to compel the railroads to
furnish shippers free accommodations on such trains. Only Con-
gress or the Interstate Commerce Commission could impose such
regulations."
Concluding its hearings on March 2, the committee on Rail-
roads and Commerce voted the next day to recommend the indef-
"/Wrf.. March 2, 1904; Wallaces' Farmer. April 22, 29, 1904, 573, 603.
'"Register and Leader. March 2, 1904.
"¡bid.. Feb. 16, 26, 1904.
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inite postponement of the DeLano bill, the majority holding it to
be unconstitutional. The House approved the committee's recom-
mendation on March 5 but only by a margin of three votes: thirty-
six to thirty-three, thirty-one members being absent or not voting.
The vote clearly revealed the ambivalent mood of the House: most
members believed that the DeLano bill was too sweeping and of
doubtful constitutionality, yet they desired to do something for
the relief of livestock shippers. Recognizing that the situation in
the House was fiuid and that it was possible to salvage part of
their program, the meat producers decided to postpone their ef-
forts to require the railroads to provide faster service and to work
for restoration of the return pass.^'
The House clearly desired to take some kind of action on the
pass question. Representative George W. Hanna, a banker-
farmer of Kossuth County, introduced a bill on January 27, re-
quiring railroads to issue free transportation to livestock ship-
pers. Representatives J. S. Pritchard, a farmer of Wright County,
and William S. Hart, an Allamakee County lawyer, introduced
similar bills on February 17. After disposing of the DeLano bill,
the committee on Railroads and Commerce referred the Hanna,
Pritchard, and Hart bills to a subcommittee for consolidation into
one bill. In effect, however, the committee referred the three bills
to the meat producers' legislative committee and the railroad at-
torneys, for the Hart bill, which the committee recommended for
passage, was based on an agreement between the two lobbies.
Hart told the House that the livestock shippers and the railroads
had both agreed to his bill and that he had a signed statement to
this effect."
The Hart bill required the railroads to provide free transpor-
tation both ways to shippers of one or more carloads of horses or
mules or two or more carloads of cattle, hogs, goats, or sheep.
When a single shipment of livestock totaled six carloads or more,
the railroad must provide free transportation for an additional
person. Return passes were to be good for thirty-six hours after
delivery of the livestock to their destination. Railroads failing to
comply with these provisions must pay the shipper three times the
"Journal of the House, 472-473; Register and Leader, March 4, 19, 1904;
Wallaces' Farmer, March 18, 25, 1904, 404, 440.
"Journal of the House, 94, 259; Register and Leader, March 9, 19, 1904;
Wallaces' Farmer. April 29, 1904, 603.
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amount of the regular round trip fare. Any person attempting to
use the free transportation, other than the owner, his agent or
employee, would be considered a trespasser.""
The Hart bill passed the House without opposition or debate,
moved quickly through the Senate, and received Governor Cum-
mins' signature on April 9, 1904." It gave the meat producers, as
Ryan remarked, all that they could "reasonably expect" to obtain
from the legislature. The law was, in effect, a compromise be-
tween the meat producers and the railroads sanctioned by the
legislature acting as a broker. The law's significance was political
rather than legal. If the legislature did not have the constitutional
authority to regulate the speed of interstate livestock trains, it
is difficult to see how it could legally require railroads to give
shippers free passage on such trains. "It was, of course, under-
stood that this [Hart] law would not be strictly legal—so under-
stood by the farmers and also by the railroad attorneys," ex-
plained Wallaces' Farmer. "It was quite as much the railroads'
bill as the farmers' bill, and was regarded as a settlement of the
pass question for the state of Iowa.""
The meat producers, meanwhile, deciding to carry their case
for faster schedules and better service directly to the railroads,
had arranged a conference with railroad officials in Chicago on
April 15. They were following in the footsteps of officials of the
National Livestock Association who had met traffic managers of
the western railroads in Chicago on February 25. The grievances
of western stockmen were similar to those of Iowa feeders: cancel-
lation of the return pass, application of the tonnage system to the
transportation of livestock, losses resulting from shrinkage in the
weight and value of stock, and discriminatory freight rates. The
meeting was reportedly harmonious. The traffic managers con-
'"Journal of the House. 629-630, 686-688. Shippers of one carload of cattle or
hogs were to receive free transportation only to the destination of their shipment.
"Ibid.. 688-689, 1028, 1045-1046. 1226, 1228, 1270, 1287, XV; Journal of
the Senate. 657, 671, 857-858, 896, 898-899, 953, 969, 1143, 1150; Registerand
Leader. March 19, April 2, 1904. The Senate deleted "free" from "free transpor-
tation" to emphasize that transportation of livestock shippers was not a gift but an
obligation of the railroads and that they were responsible for injuries suffered by
the shippers. The Senate also extended the life of shippers' return transportation
from thirty-six to forty-eight hours. The House concurred in both revisions.
"Register and Leader. March 19, 1904; Wallaces Farmer. April 29, 1904,
603.
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ceded that their service had not been satisfactory and promised to
make the necessary improvements. However, the railroads had
not yet acted on any of the complaints of western ranchers when
representatives of the Iowa meat producers and the railroads held
their meeting on April 15. Newspapers had reported, in fact, that
the western roads had decided against restoration of the return
pass on the ground that it was not a right, but a privilege and that
the railroads could not be expected to give something for noth-
ing."
In a day-long meeting at the Union League Club, the officers
of the Iowa meat producers' association, accompanied by Henry
Wallace, and the general managers of the Burlington, Illinois
Central, Milwaukee, Northwestern, and Rock Island railroads,
engaged in a lengthy discussion of their mutual problems and re-
spective positions. Henry Wallace opened the meeting with a de-
tailed discussion of the farmers' grievances, using figures sup-
plied by livestock shippers to substantiate his claim that their
losses from delayed shipments amounted to twenty-five dollars a
carload. The two sides then joined in a "frank, earnest, and thor-
ough discussion" of the shippers' complaints. Evidently eager to
understand the livestock shippers' problems, the general
managers promised to investigate their complaints and to remedy
them as much as possible. "There was the best of feehng through-
out the entire meeting," reported Henry Wallace. A. L. Ames
concurred: "we were fairly met and fairly treated by the railroad
people. " '^'
The general managers subsequently invited Ames to a second
meeting in Chicago on April 28. They told him that they had de-
cided to restore the return pass to livestock shippers throughout
the west along the lines laid down by the Hart law. They said that
they could not restore the old livestock schedules but promised
speedier hauls, particularly on the branch lines. Ames replied
that these decisions were satisfactory as far as they went. He ex-
pressed confidence in the good faith of the railroads, adding that
he believed that they and the stockmen had achieved a better un-
"Register and Leader. Feb. 25, 26, March 19, 31, 1904; Wallaces' Farmer.
March 25, 1904, 440.
"Wallaces'Farmer. April 22, 1904, 573; A. L. Ames to Wallaces' Farmer.
May 13, 1904, 673.
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derstanding of each other's position that would be mutually bene-
ficial in the future."
Securing restoration of the return pass was an important
achievement, but it was only the beginning of the meat producers'
campaign to remedy railroad abuses. Their major goals were
prompt service and fair rates. They continued to press railroad
officials to speed up their livestock trains." Recognizing that they
could eliminate the discriminatory rates and preferential prac-
tices of the railroads only by strengthening the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, they applauded and endorsed President
Roosevelt's proposal to give the Commission power to fix and en-
force reasonable rates subject to judicial review. Affiliating with
the American National Livestock Association in 1906, the meat
producers joined western cattlemen in working for the passage of
the Hepburn Act."
Increasingly committed to Progressivism by their struggle
against the railroads, the meat producers broadened their stand
on state and national issues to include most of the planks in the
Progressive platform. They urged the General Assembly to insti-
tute direct primaries, prohibit the railroads from using passes to
bribe public officials, pass a pure food law, and enact a joint rate
law to give Iowa shippers reasonable rates on shipments handled
by more than one railroad. They called upon Congress to extend
the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission by plac-
ing all corporations engaged in interstate trade under its super-
vision, adopt a reciprocal trade policy to promote the sale of
American meat abroad, and strengthen federal inspection of
meat to protect the health of American consumers and increase
the demand for American meat abroad by winning the confidence
"Ames to Wallaces' Farmer, May 13, 1904; Iowa Board of Railroad Com-
missioners, Twenty-Seventh Annual Report (Des Moines, 1905), 236-237; Wal-
laces' Farmer. May 6. 1904, 637.
"In March, 1905, for example, Ames held several meetings with officers of
the Burlington, whose livestock service at the time was the poorest of all the trunk
lines running through Iowa to Chicago. These talks bore fruit in April and May
when most of the stock shipped over the Burlington arrived on the market at 8:00
A.M. or before, whereas there had been only twelve days in March when the road
had delivered livestock before 9:00 A.M., some deliveries not being completed
until 2:30 P.M. Wallaces' Farmer. Feb. 17, April 17, June 16, 1905. Feb. 16,
1906, 221, 528. 781, 214.
"Ibid., Jan. 22, 1904, Feb. 17. 1905, Feb. 16, 1906, 99, 220-222, 214-217,
231; Register and Leader, Feb. 7, 8, 1906.

